Author: mopress

  • Narco Politics vs Civil Rights

    Something Here is Terribly Wrong

    By Greg Moses

    CounterPunch / GlobalResistanceNetwork

    Sunday morning I was poring over Scott Henson’s blog Grits for Breakfast and his updates on massive drug busts in East Texas when an email arrived from Irma L. Muniz. Occasionally Irma distributes writings from her husband Ramsey, which I gladly post at the Texas Civil Rights Review. For those of us who can remember the 1970s, Ramsey Muniz was part of our folk experience. He ran for Governor on the ticket for the party of La Raza Unida, back when it looked like the 1970s would be the start, not the end, of a glorious multi-ethnic movement for radical social change.

    One reader who found the writings of Ramsey Muniz at this site wrote me a while back expressing his own surprise and the surprise of his father that Muniz was in prison. Neither father nor son had been informed of Ramsey’s story, and both were grateful to have a source of news about a man they liked.

    So with Henson’s attention to mass arrests at Tulia, Palestine, and Longview still fresh in mind I googled “Ramsey Muniz Governor.” And the first item that shows up is a report from Los Angeles about the nasty business of narco politics. Like it or not, the nexus of narco politics draws together the stories of Ramsey Muniz and the massive drug busts of East Texas. There is a Civil Rights impact to the vicious structure of narco politics almost anywhere you look.

    Writing in the summer of 2001 on the occasion of a pending election for mayor of Los Angeles, columnist Hector Carreon produced a despairing analysis of “dirty politicos” most of them Democratic office holders who had been publicly exposed for their ties to cocaine use or cocaine profits.

    “The drug trade in Los Angeles is a multi-billion per year operation and has, like in Mexico, corrupted law enforcement and politicians,” writes Carreon. To back up his claim that law enforcement in Los Angeles has been “totally corrupted,” Carreon cites the example of one “dirty cop” who in order to plead a lower sentence in his own case started “fingering” a number of other “dirty cops” who were a little too closely tied to the cocaine trade they were supposed to be fighting. Can anyone say Serpico?

    The Los Angeles narco scandals of 2001 came to international attention in February of that year when it was revealed that Bill Clinton’s brother-in-law had accepted large sums of money from narco interests just prior to the time that the USA President commuted the prison sentence for the son of a reputed “family boss” in the narco trade.

    “This scandal has angered two large blocks of voters in Los Angeles,” wrote Carreon:

    The first is the L.A. Black community. The Black community is asking why the thirty Black youths that were imprisoned along with Carlos Vignali were not released as well. In fact, Carlos Vignali was the principal culprit in the crime. He was the one that provided the money necessary for the crack cocaine operation and was one of the main leaders. Why was he released and the others are still languishing in prison? To the Black community, this hypocrisy only shows that Chicano politicians also practice double standards when it comes to racial justice. It is no surprise, that a recent poll showed that almost 80% of Blacks will vote for James Hahn [the white candidate for L.A. mayor, instead of the Chicano candidate, Antonio Villargairosa].

    For the time being, let’s set aside the question of whether narco wars are justifiable. Carreon’s analysis of one L.A. scandal raises the same question found in the racial profile of massive drug busts of Tulia, Palestine, and Longview. When narco wars are waged upon civilian populations, are they waged fairly with respect to race?

    Henson begins the fairness question when he asks whether it is credible to believe that so many people could possibly qualify as “major dealers” in such small cities as Palestine or Longview. In Palestine authorities are prosecuting 72. In Longview, 73 arrests last week bring the recent total to 141; . Says Henson about Longview, “the idea that the town supports a 73 person crack distribtion ring, much less 141, seems highly suspect.”

    Add to Henson’s question the fact that all 72 suspects in Palestine were African American, and a new question takes shape. What is the likelihood that a 64 percent white city would support a crack distribution ring that is all Black? The demographics of the Longview busts are not yet clear. So we will wait to see if there is credible evidence of equal-opportunity narco wars in progress or if like Tulia and Palestine the racial bias of these busts is naked as your face.

    But turning back briefly to L.A., Carreon reports that the 2001 narco scandals there not only angered Black voters, but Chicano activists as well, and here is where Ramsey Muniz comes in:

    Another segment of angry voters is well informed Raza. Many of us who understand the sad state of contemporary politics, know that these dirty politicos don’t really represent our interests. These very same “politicos” have for years been ignoring the case of Ramiro “Ramsey” Muniz who is in federal prison on cocaine drug charges. Ramsey Muniz was sentenced to a life in prison without the possibility of parole after a questionable prosecution by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Many in our community believe that the prosecution was politically motivated because Ramsey Muniz was an effective and principal leader of the now destroyed La Raza Unida Party of Texas. Ramsey Muniz was a candidate for Governor of Texas under La Raza Unida and challenged the power structure of Texas in the early 1970’s. This was when La Raza Unida Party had taken control of South Texas under the leadership Jose Angel Guttierez. About two years ago, Ramsey Muniz was being tortured at Leavenworth Federal Prison in Kansas through being kept in solitary confinement for over a year. Telephone calls to all these “dirty politicos” were ignored. An emergency call to Congressman Xavier Becerra was never returned. Ramsey Muniz health was rapidly deteriorating for having to sleep on the cold concrete floor and his family was concerned that he might expire. Now we hear that Congressman Becerra was on the phone with Bill Clinton on the day when he signed the release for Carlos Vignali. Does La Raza see something terribly wrong here?

    In order to answer Carreon’s potent question, we have to get re-acquainted with Ramsey Muniz. As Diana A. Terry-Azios reported in a Texas Monthly article of Nov. 2002, Ramsey Muniz was “the first Hispanic Texan to appear on a general election ballot.” At the age of 29, his 1972 campaign took 214,000 votes away from the conservative Democrat who won the election anyway.

    The roots of Ramsey’s resistance can be traced in many directions, but we begin with a July 4 protest at the Alamo in 1967, the first public action of the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO). According to research by Teresa Palomo Acosta at the Handbook of Texas Online, MAYO began as a West San Antonio movement inspired by the Civil Rights activism of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) which by 1967 had fallen under the leadership of Stokely Carmichael.

    Chicano nationalism, Aztec symbolism, and political activism were early themes for these “brown berets.” Like Carmichael, they set out to shake things up, not only against the conservative white establishment, but also against existing civil rights organizations.

    In December 1969, MAYO led a succe

    ssful student boycott of the schools of Crystal City, and in January 1970 the party of La Raza Unida was born at Crystal City’s Campestre Hall. When party leaders went looking for a candidate to run for Governor in 1972, they found a MAYO activist in Waco. Ramsey Muniz had already earned his law degree from Baylor University and was helping to administer the Waco Model Cities Program.

    Acosta reports that Muniz in 1972 was not much of an insider to the party of La Raza Unida. At its first national conference in El Paso the party formed a national Congreso de Aztlán, but Muniz left the conference early to work on his campaign. When Frances “Sissy” Farenthold lost the Democratic primary for Governor to conservative Dolph Briscoe, Muniz and La Raza had hopes that she would throw support to the third party. But despite the white feminists decision to stick with the Democratic ticket, Muniz was able to reduce the Democratic victory to a plurality rather than majority for the first time in history.

    Even with these dramatic historical achievements to his credit, the Handbook of Texas online has no entry dedicated to the life of Ramsey Muniz, who today communicates brief messages from Ft. Leavenworth prison. In December 1994, Muniz was sentenced under federal guidelines that mandated life sentences for three felony convictions.

    Court records reflect that Ramsey had suffered two previous convictions: “one in the Southern District of Texas involving 1,100 pounds of marijuana and the other in the Western District of Texas involving 822 pounds.” Although Muniz pleaded guilty to both charges at the time, he objects to them both being counted under the three strikes rule: “because Muniz claimed that although the two prior convictions mentioned above arose out of guilty pleas in separate jurisdictions, they involved a single conspiracy.”

    For Aztlan activists in Los Angeles, the case of Ramsey Muniz is one good example of the effects that COINTELPRO had upon radical activists of his generation. For Advocates of Justice in Ramsey’s home town of Corpus Christi, the final arrest was a frame up.

    On March 11, 1994, Ramsey and a companion were arrested in Lewisville, Texas, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and “conspiring” to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. According to court documents, federal agents found 40 kilos of 88 percent pure cocaine in the trunk of a car that had been rented by Ramsey’s companion, that was three days overdue, and that had been driven briefly by Ramsey on the morning of the arrest.

    Ramsey and his companion had fallen under surveillance when they associated with a third party who was being watched at the time. Court documents describe the third party as “a suspected drug trafficker with whom the DEA was negotiating a drug sale.” He was the one who allegedly said in a restaurant conversation with Ramsey and companion that “the deal will go down.” He allegedly said it in Spanish, a language that only one narc agent within earshot could understand, and he left town shortly before the agents moved in. That third man, say Ramsey’s allies, was never charged.

    As for the statement that “the deal will go down”, Ramsey testified in court that the phrase was taken out of context. The comment was actually made in reference to funds being raised for legal services that Ramsey was arranging for the man’s family. Although Muniz had been disbarred, he was working as a legal aide.

    Ramsey’s ability to construct an alternative account for his actions was blocked by a trial court ruling that prevented him from calling a motel clerk as a witness. He wanted the clerk to verify that a fourth party had stayed at the hotel. This fourth party, says Ramsey, would have been a more likely accomplice to the now missing third party.

    But the courts ruled that while conjectures were perfectly reasonable that Ramsey intended to distribute 40 keys of cocaine, based on his attempt to walk away from federal agents and disclaim his connection to the car they were sniffing out, it would have simply confused the jury to hear Ramsey’s account of person number four, since no reasonable inferences (or reasonable doubts?) could possibly have been drawn. The well-managed jury convicted Ramsey, and the three strikes rule put him in prison for life.

    Reading the appeals court decision to uphold the conviction and life sentence of Ramsey Muniz is a chilling experience. As the appeals court would have it, according to strict reading of law, if federal agents come up to you, identify themselves, ask for your identification, and start asking you questions like, “do you mind if we frisk you for weapons,” not only are you legally free to just walk away, but you are counted as ignorant if you assume you are being detained for investigation.

    Yet in the same document, the three-judge appeals panel names the federal agents and declares in plain English that they “pursued Muniz, intercepting him at the Honda dealership.” So it’s always important to remember that whenever three federal judges in Texas agree that you have been “intercepted” by federal agents, questioned, and frisked, that you have not actually been in the eyes of those same judges “detained.”

    The nexus between marco politics and civil rights grows even more interesting when we see the Muniz appeal on a timeline next to the Hopwood decision that abolished affirmative action in Texas until the Supreme Court restored it in 2003. Both appeals were handed down by Fifth District Panels in 1996, Hopwood from the Western District on April 18, Muniz from the Eastern District on April 20. One judge actually sat on both panels. Judge Jacques Wiener in the Hopwood case tried to save affirmative action in Texas, but was outnumbered two to one in the Western District. Two days later in the Eastern District he joined legendary JFK appointee Reynaldo G. Garza and one other judge in upholding the life sentence of Ramsey Muniz.

    Ramsey argued to the appeals court that newly imposed guidelines for sentencing were constitutionally unsound. If previous convictions were going to be used against him to produce an “enhanced sentence,” argued the defrocked Baylor grad, then he should be allowed to launch collateral attacks against those convictions. The appeals court replied that if Congress had intended repeat offenders to have rights to collateral attacks against their prior convictions, then Congress would have said so. But Congress only allowed collateral attacks against convictions fewer than five years old. In their support of mandatory sentencing guidelines, Weiner and Garza were implacable.

    So here we have a guy who pleaded two guilty charges at a time when there was no “three strikes” rule and when his two guilty pleas were thrown back at him as reasons for a life sentence, he was told that he had no Constitutional grounds to complain. In the long run, Muniz may have been the more discerning legal theorist. Last year the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. vs. Booker that the sentencing guidelines can no longer be considered mandatory.

    In the most recent correspondence from prison, one hears the pain of Ramsey’s hope that the Booker ruling may open the legal window that allows him to live free before he dies. Yet today federal prison rules only allow him five hours per month to talk on the telephone. He finds himself forced to choose between speaking to his loved ones or his legal advisors. By March 13 this year, he had spent all his phone time for the month.

    Do we find something terribly wrong here? Yes, we do. What we see is the enormous power of state-backed narco warriors to
    organiz
    e suspicions into life crushing consequences. Ramsey Muniz is doing life because he fell into company with a drug trafficker who was negotiating with federal agents. The appeals court states that negotiations were underway. They say it as if it should raise no suspicion at all. Prior to Ramsey’s arrest, it was this one drug trafficker who was overheard by one federal agent talking about a deal going down at ten o’clock. For all we know, the deal that was communicated in that moment was the takedown of Ramsey Muniz.

    What we know for sure about Ramsey is that he drove someone else’s car from one motel to another and that when he spotted federal agents he tried to walk away. Once the suspicion is framed in the way that the narco agents frame it, then Ramsey’s actions are cast into a suspicious pattern. He made lots of phone calls. He travelled too much. But what if we are careful to construct Ramsey’s intent from the ground up, based solely on the evidence? What does any of his activity so carefully documented by a federal appeals court prove conclusively about Ramsey’s intent on March 11, 1994?

    There is something thin about the appeals court document that summarizes the facts of Ramsey’s case. I want to take out my pen and grade it. How can three federal judges conclude on the basis of the facts they state in the document that Ramsey Muniz was not entrapped, that he was not railroaded, that he was not made subject to the narco war’s ability to drive investigations that that look like obvious civil rights offenses? Why don’t the judges lay out the facts that a plain accusation of conspiracy would require for support? Why don’t they say where the cocaine came from or where they think it was supposed to be going at 10 o’clock on the morning of March 11? Good god, they are sending a man up for life based on a document that wouldn’t impress a teacher of freshman comp.

    Something is terribly wrong here because in the deadly narco wars the power to frame suspicion is usurped. We are not permitted to frame suspicion any other way. Why was Ramsey prevented from putting up his defense before the jury? Why was he not allowed to call his witness? Why was he prevented from demonstrating the unfairness of three strikes or the time-honored sanctions against double jeopardy?

    Why was Ramsey Muniz intercepted? And why did the appeals court rule that in the moment of his interception he should have known he could walk away. But he was walking away when he was intercepted. In the topsy turvy logic of these federal rationalizations, we suspect with Hector Carreon that the narco trade has corrupted the very structure of judgment in political life. And the pathway of that corruption cuts wide through Texas.

    But even a state as large as Texas is but a puzzle piece in the larger racist struggles of the narco wars. Why do we have comedy skits on national television dedicated to white USA Presidents and their cocaine habits while Ramsey Muniz is locked up without mercy in Leavenworth? Why do we have our third story in a row of felony arrest warrants sailing over Black neighborhoods in Texas like Passover curses hissing here comes Pharaoh to separate your sons from their lives? Make no mistake about it. In the nexus between narco politics and civil rights, something terrible is going on.

    Findlaw
    Dos Centavos: La Raza Unida Blog

  • Reaching Congress on Climate Change Issues: Interview with Alyssa Burgin

    By Nick Braune
    Mid-Valley Town Crier
    by permission

    Political leaders would like to snooze and forget the extreme effects of climate change, whereby we could eventually lose our water, food supply and even the ground we live on. This week I interviewed Alyssa Burgin of San Antonio, who is trying to wake up these leaders. She is the outreach director of Texans for Peace and is currently carrying the banner for the Texas Climate Emergency Campaign.

    Braune: Ms. Burgin, I am glad to spread the word and I presume that your climate-change bill is facing some opposition in major newspapers that have fossil fuel buddies. Could you catch us up a bit?

    Burgin: Thanks for this opportunity. Yes. You’re correct in saying that the fossil-fuel representatives are lined up in opposition to this bill, and that opposition takes the form of both direct and indirect lobbying. For example, in these economic times, newspapers can’t afford to lose any more automobile industry revenue, can they? And so it has been a tough fight all along with very seasoned opponents.

    There is some momentum however. Congressman Henry Waxman will shortly introduce a bill that gets the United States back into the Kyoto Treaty process — a necessary goal. The most important, most vilified, aspect of that treaty, and therefore of our bill, will be the cuts and caps on carbon emissions.

    Our organization, the Texas Climate Emergency Campaign, an affiliate of the national group, 1Sky, is following the recommendations of Dr. James Hansen, prominent NASA scientist and expert on climate change. He and his colleagues consider emission cuts of between 25 to 40% below 1990 levels to be an absolute necessity if we are to mitigate climate change and avoid the worst-case scenarios. And the worst case, I might add, looks very serious — sea level rises of one meter by the end of the century, the disappearance of the Himalayan glaciers by 2050, continued drought in our part of the country, and stronger hurricanes and storms.

    The good news is that these cuts are achievable — and not by drastic means, not by telling people they can’t drive their cars. But by adding incentivization to existing technology development: More wind. More solar. Increased use of simple energy efficiency. Texas could benefit greatly from the first two — more than the rest of the country, in fact. We could become the green capital of the U.S.A., maybe the world.

    Braune: How have our elected representatives from the Rio Grande Valley been responding? I think Representatives Cuellar, Ortiz and Hinojosa should show an interest, particularly if there is talk about jobs.

    Burgin: Interesting question. Actually, Congressman Cuellar is very involved in bringing wind energy to his district, and he has shown a lot of interest in solar. It’s no surprise that he signed on quickly to meet with his constituents who are committed to seeing this bill pass. Congressmen Ortiz and Hinojosa, however, have so far refused to meet with us—Ortiz, in particular, has been non-responsive. I wish they could understand what this would mean for Texas.

    We are projecting five million new jobs nationally, and again, the disproportionate number could land in Texas, due to our ability to host wind and solar farms. People who have farmed their land for generations, and have met frustration and despair due to lack of rainfall could see a new and profitable use for their property. Men and women who are tired of low-wage jobs could train for these very lucrative positions, and find a new life. Peak oil is in our past–we have to move forward into a new future, and our bill is perfect for Texas.

    Braune: I have not been following this well, but it seems to me that President Obama wants to be known as “responsible” on the environmental issues. But, personally, I am not sure how he will hold up to pressure from various business forces. Any comments?

    Burgin: We’re very concerned about President Obama’s position on these issues. Although he has indicated a desire to move forward with a new, green economy, he has learned quickly the reality of the political games played in Washington. We’re concerned that he will trade on political expediency, forgetting his commitments to putting money into green jobs, taking necessary steps to cut carbon emissions, and returning to the international climate talks.
    He needs to remember that what comes out of those climate talks will only be as strong as what the U.S. will commit to, because other nations (particularly those in the developing world) are waiting on our action. This could be our last opportunity; in fact, this could be humanity’s last opportunity. Let’s not waste it.

    (Alyssa Burgin’s email: aburgin@texansforpeace.org. The Texas Climate Emergency Campaign will also be participating in a Socially Responsible Investment Coaltion event on April 23rd: “Care, Climate and Cash: Current Crises.” The event is to be held at the Oblate Grotto Ministries in San Antonio.)

  • Hazahzas ''Tired Cries Have Been Heard''

    Email from Suzi Hazahza’s finace:

    My Dear Friends,

    I have received wonderful news today that lifted my weary spirit and I just wanted to take this opportunity to thank each and every one of you for your prayers, support, kind thoughts, attention and concern for the Hazahzas and myself.
    The Hazahzas are not free yet, but their tired cries have been heard and recognized by our Judiciary System. This in itself is great news and the reason for my absolute faith in our great nation.

    I firstly owe this to the ONE and the ONLY, All Loving Universal Power, for nothing is possible without it. This has probably been and will continue to be the greatest test of my life.

    I do not know how I could maintain the power to continue this journey if it wasn’t for the bright light of hope that lights up my entire being while walking along this dark road. I have always been aware of the unconditional love and support sent forth by the Almighty manifested in many forms to help us get through these difficult times. We are forever thankful to the source and its many manifestations.

    Words simply cannot convey the depth of my gratitude to all those who have stood by us and have filled us with much love and hope. We extend our appreciation to you all including:

    Mr. Ralph Isenberg, for committing all your available resources to this case. This would not have been possible without you;

    Mr. Joshua Bardavid, for your outstanding legal assistance;

    Dr. Asma Salam, for your selfless efforts in bringing awareness to this issue and organizing the vigils;

    Mr. Jay Johnson, for your unbelievable commitment to uphold the principals of civil and human rights;

    Mr. Abu-Rish, for making your resources available to the Hazahzas;

    Mr. Greg Moses, for keeping everyone updated with respect to the parameters of this case;

    Mr. Tedd Cox and Mr. Surjio Alaman for supporting Mr. Bardavid with respect to the legal matters;

    Ms. Rose Flores, for your unconditional support and for being by our side from day one. You are an absolute angel;

    And all my dear and close friends whom have held my hands during this walk of life.

    I hope and have faith that the Hazahzas will be reunited soon.

    I love you all and thank you from the bottom of my heart.

    Reza Barkhordari

  • Stickney: Hazahza Habeas Held in ABEYANCE until May 2

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    DALLAS DIVISION

    RADI HAZAHZA, #A95-219-510, et al.,
    Petitioners,

    v.

    MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,
    Respondents.

    3:07-CV-0327-D
    ECF

    FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
    OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

    Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b), and an order of the District Court filed
    on February 21, 2007, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The
    findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:

    FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

    Type of Case: This is a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by five detainees of the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging their continued detention
    pending removal under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq.
    Parties: Petitioners are presently confined at the Rolling Plains Detention Center in
    Haskell, Texas.

    Respondents are Michael Chertoff, Secretary Department of Homeland Security; Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States; ICE; Nuria Prendes, Director Office of Detention and Removal Operations; John P. Torres, Director, Office of Detention and Removal; and Warden Watson, Rolling Plains Detention Facility. The Court issued process in this case.

    Statement of Case: Petitioners, a father and four of his five children, are Stateless
    individuals either born within the Palestinian Territories or of Palestinian ethnicity born in
    Jordan. (Petition (Pet.) at 6). They entered the United States as non-immigrants on B2 visas for
    a period of six months on Jordanian passports. (Id.). Prior to the expiration of their visas,
    Petitioners applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality
    Act (“INA”), and relief under Article III of the Convention Against Torture. (Id.). On August
    15, 2002, an immigration judge denied Petitioners’ application, found them to be citizens of
    Jordan, and ordered them removed to either Jordan or the Occupied Territories. (Id. at 7).
    Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the immigration judge returned because
    jurisdiction lay with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.). Petitioners immediately
    filed an appeal to the BIA, which in turn rejected it as being untimely on March 1, 2004.
    (Respondents’ Exh. 2). On April 18, 2005, the Fifth Circuit dismissed their petition for review.
    (Pet. at 7). Subsequently, on November 2, 2006, “armed and armored officials from . . . [ICE]
    conducted a middle of the night ‘raid’ of Petitioners’ home, and detained all Petitioners,
    including” Petitioner Radi’s wife and minor son. (Pet. at 9).

    In this habeas action, Petitioners challenge their continued detention pending removal and the conditions of their detention.2

    In response to the Court’s order to show cause, Respondents filed a response to which
    Petitioners filed a reply. The Court then heard oral arguments on March 29, 2007. On the same day, Respondents filed their Post-Hearing Submission.

    Findings and Conclusions: As an initial matter, the Court pauses to address its jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Real ID Act stripped district courts of jurisdiction over 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitions attacking removal orders.3 See Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733, 735-36 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1055 (2006). Nonetheless, the Real ID Act left intact a district court’s ability to adjudicate an alien’s claim regarding the constitutionality of his continued detention. See, e.g., Gul v. Rozos, 163 Fed.Appx. 317, 319 (5th Cir. 2006). Because Petitioners challenge their continued detention, rather than the validity of their removal order, the Court is fully empowered to consider their
    claim. See id.

    The detention, release, and removal of aliens subject to a final order of removal is governed by § 241 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Section 1231(a)(1)(A) provides that, after entry of an order of removal, “the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” See also 8 C.F.R. § 241.3.4 During the 90-day removal period, the alien must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). After the ninety-day period, if the alien does not leave or he has not been removed, he must be released under the supervision of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
    Under limited circumstances, certain aliens may be detained beyond the removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which provides that the Attorney General may detain beyond the 90-day removal period aliens who are inadmissible, aliens who have committed aggravated felonies, aliens who are otherwise dangerous, and aliens who are a flight risk.5

    In this action, Respondents rely on § 1231(a)(6) as the basis for Petitioners’ continued
    detention, contending they have been “determined by the Attorney General to be . . . unlikely to
    comply with the order of removal,” in other words that they are a flight risk.

    1. Flight Risk under Section 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
    The Court is troubled and deeply concerned by Respondents’ unsupported and conclusory assertion that Petitioners are a flight risk because Petitioner Radi failed to appear for an unspecified appointment to “[d]iscuss [his] case” with ICE on July 1, 2005. (Respondents’ Exh. 3). According to Respondents, Form G-56, which advised Petitioner Radi of the appointment, was mailed to Petitioners’ home address and to their former attorney. Respondents have no proof to substantiate either the mailing or receipt of Form G-56, and Petitioners dispute ever receiving the same.6

    Nevertheless Respondents assert that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips federal district courts of jurisdiction to review discretionary immigration decisions of the Attorney General where such a discretion is specified in a statute. (Respondents’ Post-Hearing Submission at 1-2).

    Section 1252, entitled “Judicial Review of Orders of Removal” reads in subsection (a)(2) as follows:

    (B) Denials of discretionary relief

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the
    judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review–

    (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

    8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).7

    Respondents have cited no cases, nor has this Court found any, addressing whether the Attorney General’s determination of flight risk under § 1231(a)(6) falls within the jurisdiction stripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The Fifth Circuit has narrowly interpreted §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to strip courts “‘only of jurisdiction to review’ the discretionary authority that
    is ‘specified in the statute.’” Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005)). It has reiterated “that the language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is thoroughly ‘pellucid on this score; it does not allude generally to ‘discretionary authority’ or to discretionary authority exercised under this statute,’ but specifically to ‘authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.’” Id; see also Manzano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

    Section 1231(a)(6) purportedly grants discretion to the Attorney General to determine whether aliens ordered removed, such as the Petitioners in this case, are a flight risk. It provides that “[a]n alien ordered removed . . . who has been determined by the Attorney General to be . . . unlikely to comply with the order of removal may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .”
    8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (emphasis added). Since the above statute appears to grant discretion to the Attorney General to determine flight risk, this Court has no choice but to conclude that the jurisdiction stripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, thus barring all judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision that Petitioners are a flight risk.

    2. Presumptive-Six-Month Detention Under § 1231(a)(6)

    Next Petitioners challenge the extent of the Attorney General’s authority to detain them
    under § 1231(a)(6). Since that authority is not a matter of discretion, unlike the flight-risk
    determination previously addressed, habeas jurisdiction remains available. Zadvydas v. Davis,
    533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001).

    Relying on Zadvydas, Respondents contend that Petitioners’ detention under § 1231(a)(6) is presumptively reasonable for six months, or until May 2, 2007. Thus, they contend the petition is premature and should be dismissed. Petitioners argue that, since the 90-day removal period expired long before their apprehension, it should not be considered to be part of the sixmonth presumptive period.

    In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court stated that it recognized a six-month period “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts.” 533 U.S. at 700-701. Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court viewed the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 and n. 3 (11th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases at note 3).

    In this case, the parties agree that Petitioners’ removal order became administratively final on March 1, 2004, when the BIA dismissed their appeal. Thus, it is undisputed that the initial 90-day removal period elapsed long before they were detained on November 2, 2006.

    Petitioners rely on Ulysse v. Dept’ of Homeland Security, 291 F.Supp.2d 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2003), which rejected ICE’s assertion that the initial 90-day removal period under § 1231(a)(1) begins when a petitioner is taken into custody. This decision, however, is limited to detention during the initial 90-day- removal period under § 1231(a)(1), which is not at issue in this case.
    In fact, the Ulysse court specifically noted that ICE did not suggest that the petitioner had committed any crimes, was dangerous, or posed a flight risk to justify detention under § 1231(a)(6). Id. at 1325 and n. 12.

    Respondents rely on Vulaj v. Baker, 2006 WL 3253256 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2006), to argue that the six-month period of reasonable detention cannot be triggered until a petitioner is actually detained under § 1231(a)(6). In Baker, the order of removal became administratively final on May 17, 2002, when the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s order of removal and
    granted petitioner thirty days to voluntarily depart. The petitioner did not appeal and did not depart voluntarily. On September 25, 2006, the petitioner was arrested. The court held that “[u]nder § 1231(a)(6) his detention [was] mandatory for 90 days, and it [was] presumptively reasonable for up to six months under Zadvydas.” The court further held that “because petitioner ha[d] only been in custody since September 25, 2006, his petition for writ of habeas corpus [was] premature.”8

    This Court finds the Baker decision persuasive, insofar as it is bound by the Attorney General’s determination that Petitioners are a flight risk. The Court, thus, concludes that the presumptive-six-month period under Zadvydas begins when a petitioner is first taken into custody under § 1231(a)(6), regardless of when the initial 90-day removal period elapsed.9

    Presently Petitioners have been in custody for five months. The six-month presumptive period will elapse in less than thirty days, on May 2, 2007. Relying on Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 and n. 3, this Court has dismissed a habeas petition as premature if the petitioner could not show that he had been in post-order removal detention for at least six months from the date his removal order became final. See Diallo v. Gonzales, et al., 2007 WL 942094,
    No. 3:06cv2155-N (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div. Mar. 28, 2007) (accepting findings and conclusions of magistrate judge) (dismissing claim under § 1231(a)(6) without prejudice as premature because filed before expiration of the six-month presumptive period); Nagib v. Gonzales, 2006 WL 1499682, No. 3:06cv0294-G (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div. May 31, 2006) (same); Kudryashov v. Gonzales, No. 3:05cv0775-H (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div., Sep. 27, 2005) (same); Apau v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 21801154, No. 3:02cv2652-D (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div.), findings, conclusions and
    recommendation accepted (Aug. 8, 2003) (same).

    In light of the unusual circumstances of this case, and the fact that the initial 90-day removal order expired long before Petitioners’ apprehension, the Court recommends that the petition be held in abeyance until May 2, 2007, in lieu of it being dismissed as premature.

    3. Detention Beyond Six-Month Period under § 1231(a)(6)

    Zadvydas provides that if the alien has not been removed within six months and removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention under § 1231(a)(6) is not authorized. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 699. The alien may petition the court for release if he can show that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the foreseeable future. Id at 701.
    Respondents are then required to rebut the showing with evidence. Id.

    In its February 2, 2007 Decision to Continue Detention, ICE informed Petitioners that a “request for a travel document was forwarded to the Embassy of Israel.” (Petition at Exh. 17). Petitioners argue that Respondents cannot obtain travel documents from Israel – a country of which they are not citizens nor to which they have been ordered removed. (Petitioners’ Reply at 7). In support, they cite Yassir v. Ashcroft, 111 Fed.Appx. 75, *2 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding case
    to district court to determine whether petitioner, a stateless Palestianian who had been detained for nearly four years, should be released under supervision, and noting that under the Oslo Accord between Palestinians and Israelis, no travel documents can be issued for any person who does not have official Israeli or Palestinian identification), and Abdel-Muhti v. Ashcroft, 314 F.Supp.2d 418, 425-27 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that continued detention of stateless Palestinian for a period approaching two years violated the INA despite new procedures regarding Palestinian repatriation agreed upon in early March 2004 between U.S. and Israel officials).

    At oral argument, Respondents were unable to provide an update with respect to the steps being taken to secure travel documents from Israel. They reiterated, however, that Petitioners have not met their initial burden of providing good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. This Court disagrees. Petitioners
    have requested travel documents from numerous countries in an effort to expedite their removal. While Respondents argue that they need to do more, they fail to specify what if anything else they can or should to do at this point to facilitate the issuance of travel documents from Israel or any other country. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioners have met their initial burden, and that Respondents should be required to rebut Petitioners’ showing that their removal is unlikely in the reasonable foreseeable future.

    RECOMMENDATION:

    For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the habeas corpus pet

    ition be held in ABEYANCE until May 2, 2007, at which time Respondents should be REQUIRED to rebut Petitioners’ showing that their removal is unlikely in the reasonable forseeable future.

    A copy of this recommendation shall be served electronically on counsel for Petitioners and counsel for Respondents.

    Signed April 3, 2007.

    PAUL D. STICKNEY
    UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

    1 Nazmeih Juma, wife of Petitioner Radi Hazahza (Petitioner Radi) and mother of the remaining Petitioners, was released by ICE on February 6, 2007, along with her minor son, Mohammed Hazahza.

    2 The conditions of Petitioners’ detention at the Rolling Plains Detention Center are more appropriately reviewed in a civil rights action. Therefore, the District Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over that claim in this action.

    3 The REAL ID Act is part of the much broader Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005).

    4 The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) the date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (ii) if the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order; (iii) if the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (1)(B)(i)-(iii).

    8 C.F.R. § 241.1 provides that a removal order becomes final upon the occurrence of one
    of the following circumstances set out in 8 C.F.R. 1241.1:

    (a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the [BIA]; (b) Upon waiver of appeal by the [alien];
    (c) Upon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the [alien] does not file an appeal within that time; (d) If certified to the [BIA], upon the date of the subsequent decision ordering removal; (e) If an immigration judge orders an alien removed in the alien’s
    absence, immediately upon entry of such order; or (f) If an immigration judge issues an alternate order of removal in connection with a grant of voluntary departure, upon overstay of the voluntary departure period except where the [alien] has filed a timely
    appeal with the Board. In such a case, the order shall become final upon an order of removal by the Board or the Attorney General, or upon overstay of any voluntary departure period granted or reinstated by the Board or the Attorney General.

    5 Section 1231(a)(6) reads as follows:

    An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
    removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community
    or unlikely to comply with the order of removal may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).

    6 At oral argument Petitioners’ counsel informed the Court that ICE uses Form I-166 to notify aliens that arrangements have been made for their removal, and that they should report to the designated appointment with their luggage ready for removal. Unlike Form G-56, Form I-166 is mailed certified mail return receipt requested.

    Respondents’ counsel did not rebut the above assertion, nor could he explain why Form G-56 was addressed only to Petitioner Radi, although all Petitioners were deemed a flight risk by virtue of their failure to appear at the July 1, 2005 appointment.

    7 “[T]his subchapter” refers to subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8, which covers sections 1151 through 1378. Guyadin v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Onyinkwa v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2004); Shah v. Chertoff, 2006 WL 2859375, *3 (N.D.Tex. 2006).

    8 In their response, Respondents also rely on Cuevas-Rodriguez v. Chertoff, 2006 WL 1421032 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2006). That case, however, is distinguishable because the alien was confined on the basis of a criminal conviction until April 24, 2006. Hence the removal period under § 1231(a)(1) did not begin until the date of his release from detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii).

    9 Apart from Baker, the Court has found no authority interpreting whether the presumptive period of detention under § 1231(a)(6) should always be six months, or whether it should be reduced to 90 days in cases, such as this, where the 90-day removal period expired long before Petitioners’ detention.